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Explanatory Statements – The Theory of Why
Aharon Grenadir, Touro College, Brooklyn, NY

What is an Explanation?

Explanations in Biblical Hebrew

An explanatory statement is a compound
statement that presents a justification (a reason)
for the truth of an assertion or a denial. For
example:

The Hebrew word ki  כיhas four meanings, one of
which,  דהא, is to introduce a reason for a
previously mentioned statement.

(1) Humility is good because it is the result of
straight reason.
(2) Since humility is the result of straight
reason, therefore humility is good. (reversal
of the order of the clauses of the statement)

דאמר ר"ל כי משמש בד' לשונות אי דילמא אלא דהא

These statements assert that the fact that humility
is the result of straight reason is a justification for
the fact that humility is good.
If we have an explanatory statement
‘A because B’ or ‘since B therefore A’
then we say that B is a reason or justification or
grounds for A. An explanatory statement has the
following parts:

• the main clause A – the clause that presents the
assertion or denial. It is called the explanandum.
• the explanatory clause B – the clause that
offers the justification or reason for the truth of
the main clause. It is called the explanans, and it
answers the question WHY.
Explanatory statements cannot be modeled in
modern formal logic for two reasons:
•

•

The FOPL conditional statement ‘B  A’ does not
capture the explanatory nature of the explanatory
connection, it only expresses the fact that the truth
of B ‘materially’ implies the truth of A. For
example, if A=‘fire is hot’ and B = ‘1+1 equals 2’,
then ‘B  A’ is true but ‘A because B’ is false.
The ‘because’ connective is referentially opaque.
Even if statement B is necessarily equivalent to
statement C, the two explanatory statements ‘A
because B’ and ‘A because C’ may have different
truth values.

Every explanatory statement generates a
syllogism. For the example above:
Everything that is the result of straight reason is good.

Humility is the result of straight reason.
 Humility is good.

In Rosh HaShanah 3a:

Reish Lakish said: The Hebrew word ki is used
in the Bible in four senses: if, perhaps, but, and
because.

Example of Ki – Rosh HaShana 3a
)במדבר כ' כ"ט( ויראו כל העדה כי גוע אהרן וא"ר
אבהו אל תקרי ויראו אלא וייראו כדריש לקיש
“And all the congregation saw that [ki] Aaron
was dead, and they wept for Aaron thirty days,
all the house of Israel” (Numbers 20:29). About
this, Rabbi Abahu said: Do not read the verse
as: “And they saw [vayiru]”; rather, read it as:
“And they were seen [vayeira’u]” by others,
because the cover of the clouds of glory had been
removed from them. And the next word, “that
[ki],” should be understood as meaning because,
like the statement of Reish Lakish. Therefore, the
verse should be understood as follows:
(3) And all the congregation was seen, i.e.
revealed,
because [ki] Aaron had died.
Here the simple meaning (the pshat) of the word
ki in this pasuk is an introduction to a sentential
complement ‘that Aaron had died’ that provides
an answer to the question ‘What did the
congregation see?’
Rabbi Abahu however interprets this ki (a
drasha) as an introduction to an explanatory
clause that answers the question ‘Why was the
congregation seen, i.e. revealed? Because the
cover of the clouds of glory had been removed
from them. And why was that the case?’ with the
answer ‘because Aaron had died’ .

Subject-Dependent Explanation:
the Ramchal’s 24 Logical Aspects

Example of Subject-Dependent
Explanatory Statements – Shabbos 111b

Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto writes in the
Supplement to Sefer HaHiggayon, called the K’naf
Hekeshim, an analysis of explanatory statements
using the 21 technical terms of logic. In Chapter 11

ר"מ אומר כל קשר שהוא יכול להתירו באחת מידיו אין חייבין עליו
Rabbi Meir says: For any knot that one can untie with
one hand, one is not liable for tying it on Shabbos to bring
a sin-offering.
בעי רב אחדבוי אחוי דמר אחא עניבה לר"מ מהו טעמיה דר"מ
משום דיכול להתירו באחת מידיו הוא והא נמי יכול להתירו או
:דילמא טעמא דר"מ משום דלא מיהדק והא מיהדק תיקו
Rav Acḥadvoi, brother of Mar Acḥa, raised a dilemma: Is it
permitted to tie a bow tightly on Shabbos , according to
Rabbi Meir? Is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Meir
that because one can untie the knot with one hand, it is
not considered a permanent knot (even if he intended it to
be permanent – Rashi), and this bow too, he can untie it
with one hand and therefore he would not be liable for
tying on Shabbos? Or perhaps the reason for the opinion of
Rabbi Meir is because typically a knot that can be untied
with one hand is not particularly tight, and this bow is
tight and therefore it is prohibited to tie it on Shabbos. The
Gemara concludes: Let it stand unresolved.

of Sefer Derech Tvunos , the Ramchal presents 24
logical aspects (havchanos), that can be used for
delineating topics:

Essence, Parts, Quality, Quantity, Material,
Form, Action, Consequence, Genus and Species,
Cause, Means, Motivation, Purpose, Result,
Attribute, Location, Position, Movement, Time,
Relation, Subject, Comparison, Difference,
Contrast
For explanations where the explanatory factor is
simple an aspect of the subject, the explanatory
statement has the following form:
(4) M has-property Z
because (R of M) has-property Y
Where subject (R of M) of the explanatory clause
is a relational correlative of the subject of the main
clause, using the relationship R from among the 24
logical aspects.
For example:
(5) Humility is good because its CAUSE is
straight reason.
(6) Learning Torah is good because its SPECIES
is actions that are fulfillment of a Torah
commandment.
(7) Learning Torah is good because its RESULT
is good action.
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According to the first side of the dilemma,
(8) A knot that one can untie with one hand has the
property that one who ties it on Shabbos is not liable
because the knot has the property that one can
untie it with one hand.
According to the second side, the qualification stated by
Rabbi Meir is only a siman, not a taama:
(9) A knot that one can untie with one hand has the
property that one who ties it on Shabbos is not liable
because its QUALITY is lack of tightness.

Relational Explanatory Statements
Besides statements where the predicate is a simple
property of the subject, such as ‘humility is good’, we also
have relational statements of the form
(10) M has-property (R of N)
where the predicate is composed of a relational term R and
a correlate term N.
In the case of a relational main clause where the
explanation depends solely upon the correlate:
(11) M has-property (R of N)
because N has-property Y
then we can rewrite the main clause so that its subject is
the correlate as follows:
(12) N has the property that M has-property (R of N)
because N has-property Y
However, if the explanation depends upon the relation
between the subject and correlate in the main clause:
(13) M has-property (R of N)
because M has-property (Q of N)
we have a new type, a relational explanatory statement:
(14) A person cannot makdish a stolen object
because he does not own the object

